

EX N63-A

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST.

NO. 1.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and ors.

- AGAINST -

ARAKI, SADA0, and ors.

I, GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY of Sydney in the State of New South Wales, make oath and say as follows:-

1. I was NX34999, Lt. Colonel George Ernest Ramsay, 2/30 Australian Infantry Battalion when I was captured by the Japanese at Singapore in February, 1942.

2. I was transferred to the 2/18 Battalion on a day in April, 1942 I left there with A Force which was a force of 3000 under Brigadier Varley. We were to move overseas to an unknown destination. I was in command of 1 Bn. of A Force. It consisted of about 850 all ranks. We embarked on the CELEBES MARU with 1000 troops which included my own 1 Bn and a detachment from the 2/4 CCS. The remaining 2000 embarked on the TOYASHI MARU under Brigadier Varley. Before leaving we were told that the force would go to the same destination as the other one but in fact 1000 men were dropped at Victoria Point on the extreme tip of lower Burma, and the next 1000 with me were dropped at MERGUI.

3. The remaining 1000 under Brigadier Varley were disembarked at TAVOY.

4. We got to Tavoy in late August or September, 1942. Brigadier Varley was still there with portion of the original 1000 but he was in a separate camp and I was denied official access to him.

5. On leaving TAVOY we moved to THANBUYZYAT by rail and also on foot. This was in December, 1942. Colonel NAGATOMO had his headquarters at THANBUYZYAT and when I was at THANBUYZYAT Brig. Varley had established his own headquarters there. He stayed in THANBUYZYAT for a night or two and then moved to 26 Kilo Camp. Hitherto we had been with Jap front line troops; but on arrival at 26 Kilo camp we had our first experience with Koreans as guards. They were pretty bad.

6. A Jap sergeant named FANATO was there; a Jap engineer officer also was there and they were insistent on a certain number of our men going out to work each day. I wrote to them several times and made verbal protests against the numbers of men being required and setting out the reasons why their requests were impossible of fulfilment. He threatened on several occasions, and did on several occasions parade the whole camp and selected the men himself. This was the Jap officer. We were sometimes, however, able to substitute

For these men other men whom the M.O. regarded as fit for work. The ones picked out by the Jap officer. Throughout, the question of work quotas was one of daily dispute and trouble.

7. From 26 Kilo camp we moved to 25 Kilo camp, called MEILOE. There we struck a worse crowd of Korean guards than at 26 camp. There was a lot of indiscriminate bashing there though no serious injuries were sustained. The health of the men was poor. Men would be required to leave the camp early in the morning and would not return until 2 or 3 the next morning; then they would be compelled to leave again the same morning shortly after dawn. Occasionally protests to the Japs resulted in some of the men being given an extra hour or two of rest. The rainy season there, men often worked in mud up to their knees and they had no change of clothing. Meals were only fair.

8. The Jap engineer soldiers ill-treated the men a lot by hitting them with bamboos, their fists and rifle butts, through no fault of the men but due to the impatience of the Japs who could not understand that the men did not understand what was being required of them all of the time.

9. Jap Commander there was Lieut. HOSHI. I had my own force - Ramsay force and Black and Green forces.

10. Korean guards apparently under instructions from the camp commander often forced men out to work. HOSHI would often promise that they would not be sent out without the concurrence of our M.Os but he failed to pass those instructions on to his Korean administrative staff apparently, anyway. So, when the work party was formed in the morning, he would not be available, and the Koreans would deny that they had received instructions from their commander. On one occasion I went up and found him in the grounds just as a party of our men just selected were being sent out. I reminded him of his promise, pointed out the men to him, and he ordered them back to camp. However, he seemed to take great care subsequently that he was never about the place when other parties were going out. In this camp we had about 10 deaths.

11. We moved to 105 Kilo camp, called AUNGANAUNG, in April or May 1943, and remained there for seven months. It was there we struck tropical ulcers pretty badly, a lot of the men getting them. There was a hospital back at 55 Kilo called the Death Camp. Some men were sent back there for amputation. There were over 100 amputation cases and some died after the operation. The M.Os. at 105 Kilo camp were Captains Cumming, Higgin, Anderson and White; they were all A.M.C. Our camp in strength varied between the 2000 and 2500 mark. Of my original force of 1000 men I lost 128; I put my deaths down at 15%. There were 158 deaths at the 105 Kilo camp from the mixed force in the seven months. There were instances of men being knocked about by the Japs and the Koreans with bamboos and other things, necessitating medical treatment. Koreans were particularly brutal. If they wanted to punish a man they would

strike him anywhere at all, and on half healed ulcers. They have kicked men on the shins and the shins had ulcers on them. I saw Japs screw a stick into a man's navel. Lt. HOSHI was commander there.

12. Ulcers extended from knee to ankle, exposing the shinbone for 8 or 9 inches. They went black. I have seen ulcers cover a whole foot. The question of iodiform was a pressing one throughout and once one of my men said he had been offered a small jar of iodiform by a Jap in exchange for his watch. He had been pestered several times to exchange his watch but as it was a present from his mother he did not want to let it go. However, in order to relieve his friend's suffering from ulcers he finally let it go for the bottle of iodiform from the Jap. I told the Jap Commander that the bottle could only have been obtained by illegal means by his men. The exchange was made in the presence of the Jap Commander. The iodiform was in a bottle about 12 inches by 3 inches. Our M.O. said there was enough in it to last several weeks. There was no label on it.

13. At the 105 camp there was a lot of dysentery and some malaria. We had 3 to 4 cholera deaths there. There were no medical supplies; we tried to get emetine from as far back as MERGUI but never could.

14. In December, 1943, after completion of the railway, we moved to TANARKAN.

15. There was a statement that the railway had to be put down at all costs - responsibility for that was with Col. NAGATOMO, who was i/c of No. 3 Branch, which took in our A Force, and Co. Williams' force which had come from Java.

16. Later Col. NAKALURA, who took Col. NAGATOMO'S place, spoke in similar terms. He said we were only a rabble army and that we were dependent on the Jap Imperial Army for our safety. NAGATOMO had once read out some such statement in Japanese and then his interpreter read it out in English. There are copies of this; copies were left with us.

17. NAGATOMO came out to the camp on one or two occasions, but did not go right through. At no time did he interview me in the latter stages, or ask if I had any complaints generally. Neither of these two Jap Commanders ensured that their instructions, whatever they were after I had had early interviews with them, were carried out. Perhaps they all of the time had no intention of giving these instructions. There always seemed to be a general desire on the part of Japanese Commanders to evade responsibility. Hoshi would send his batman out, if we called, to say Hoshi was indisposed and could not be disturbed. Once we arrived too quickly for him; we got onto the verandah of his cottage and through the window saw him just getting into bed, clothed, with his boots on. He came out subsequently and saw us. But that was

THIS dodge.

18. On 1 January, 1944, we reached TAMARKAN. It was alleged to be a rest camp. Food for the first few months was a considerable improvement on anything we had had. There were not many troops there when we arrived, but troops came all of the time out of the jungle from the jungle camps and by May there must have been about 5000 troops there.

19. There were constant irritation tactics and minor bashings. These were daily occurrences. At one time the camp commander was MATSUSAKI. No indication was ever given to me by the Japs of any change in their command there.

20. In August, 1944, the Japs re-organised their groups. Colonel Anderson, who had taken Frig. Varley's place, took over command from me.

21. There were some deaths at Tamarkan. In the "black month" we lost about 2 a day; we took dead bodies straight from the trucks. Dysentery and fever and malnutrition caused most of the deaths. We had no quinine or atabrin. There was a Jap M.O. at NAGATOLO's headquarters who occasionally visited the camp, and once more in their usual style they agreed that the men were very sick; but I was told by the commander later that the men were fit to work because his M.O. had so reported. The name of the Jap M.O. was HIGUCHI. The M.O. at Tamarkan was NOBOSAWA. I believe neither of them had any medical background. HIGUCHI was a dentist and NOBOSAWA a vet. Our senior M.O. was Col. Hamilton. For most of the time, before Col. Hamilton, Major Hobbs was our M.O. at TAMARKAN.

22. We remained at TAMARKAN until February, 1945, when they separated officers from Ors.

23. We were moved to KANBULI; a party of 3,000, including Australian, British, American and Dutch. All officers. They moved the officers on a 6-day trip by river and on foot to a new camp, and parties went in batches of 500. Five parties already had left at intervals of 5 days each. I reached BANGKOK on the night we were notified that the war was over. The camp site was on the other side of BANGKOK.

24. Lieut NITO, Chief of Staff of NAGATOMO, once visited our camp. Normally he had been drinking before his arrival. He told Major Green, Col. Black and me that he could promise us an honourable death, and that if things went bad he would shoot us himself. /

/s/ G. E. Ramsay.

TAKEN AND SWORN AT SYDNEY ON THE TENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER,
1946. BEFORE ME /s/ R. L. Deasey, J.P.

EXHIBIT NO. 1563A

Doc 5038A

余、ジョージ・アーネスト・ラムゼー

(GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY)

住所 ニーサウスウェールズ州、ポドニー市

ハ宣誓、上座、証言ヲ為ス

一、千九百四十二年(昭和十七年)二月、ミニゲポールニ
於テ日本軍ニ依リ捕虜トナリシトキ余、ジョージ
・アーネスト・ラムゼーハ、中佐ニシテ、濠州歩兵
二ノ大隊ニ所属シ、標識番號、NX三
四九九ヲアツタ。

二、余ハ千九百四十二年(昭和十七年)四月某日
ヲ、ハ大隊ニ転属セラル。余ハ、グーレイ
・VARLEYノ準將指揮下ノ兵カニ
ノA部隊ト共ニ其處ヲ去リ。

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 301
下二頁ニ續ク

No 1

Doc 5038A

我々ハ海ヲ越エ 某目的地へ移ルノテアツタ。
余ハA部隊ノ大隊ヲ指揮シテ居タ。此ノ部隊
ハ各階級ノモノ約八百五十名ヨリ成リ立ツテ居タ。
我々ハ余ノ大隊及ビ2/4戦線豫備病隊(C、
C、S)ノ分遣隊ヲ含ム一千ノ兵ト共ニセレベスル
ニ乗船シタ。残余ノ二千名ハヴァーレーノ
指揮ヲ下ニトセシ丸ノTOYASHI MARUニ
乗船シタ。

出発スル前、此ノ隊ハモウワノ隊ト同一目的地
ニ赴クノダト云ヒ聞カサレテ居タ。然シ實際
ノトコロ千名ハ南部ビルマノ最先端ビクトリヤポイント
VICTORIA POINTニ下船サセラレ、ソシテ
余ヲ含ム爾余ノ千名ハ、マングワイ/MERGLI
デ下船シタ。

三、ヴァーレーノ準將麾下ノ残余ノ千名ハ、タボイ/T
AVOYノ上陸セシメラレタ。

四、我々ハ一九四三年/昭和十七年八月下旬乃至九月ニ、タボ
イニ到着シタ。ヴァーレーノ準將ハ元ノ千名ノ一部ト共ニ
未ダ其處ニ居タ。然シ彼ハ別ノキャンプニ居タ。余ハ
彼ニ対スル公式ノ接近ヲ拒否サタ。

五、タボイヲ出発シテ、鉄道及ビ徒歩ニテ、サンバイテ
ヤット/THANBURYATニ移ツタ。時ニ一九四三年
/昭和十七年十二月デアツタ。ナガトモ大佐/NAGATO
MOハサンバイテヤットニ彼ノ司令部ヲ設ケテ居タ。

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ソニテ余がサニバイグヤットニ居タ時、ザア・レイ準將、彼自身
ノ司令部ヲ其處ニ設置シタ。彼ハサニバイグヤットニ一ニ走
テ、在リテ後ニ十六キロキヤンニ移動シタ。此ニ迄吾々
ハ日本軍ノ第一師部隊ト一端ニ居タゲアルがニ十六キロキヤ
ンニ到着シテ監視トシテ朝鮮人ヲ初メ体験シタ。彼等奇成ニ悪カ
六、其處ニハ「FANAT」ト云フ日本人軍曹が居タ。日
本人兵將校ニ一人居タが、彼等、我々ノ中ヨリ或ル人数
ヲ毎日勞務ニ出ス極トノ要求ヲ回報シタ。余、彼等ニ
對シ、數回富面ヲ送り、又屢次口頭ヲ以テ彼等ノ要求
スル人数ニ對シ抗議ヲ爲シ、彼等ノ要求ヲ充タス事不
可能ナル理由ヲ述ベタ。彼、度々悲喝ニ出タ。又彼、度々全
キヤンヲ査閲シ自分テ人質ノ選擇ヲシタ。之ハ右ノ日本人
將校ヲシタ。然シ、我々、時々其ノ日本人將校ノ選ニ兵
隊ノ代リニ我が軍醫ガヨリ適当ト認メタ兵ヲ以テ之ニ替
ヘルコトが出來タ。始終勞働割問題が日々ノ論争及ビ悩
ミノ一ツニシタ。

我々ハニ十六キロキヤン「マロ山」ト云フ所ニ居ルヤ
五キロキヤンニ移動シタ。此處ニテニ十六キロキヤンニ三ニ思ハ朝鮮
人監視ノ團ニ出合タ。重傷者ハ出サナカッタが、無差別的ニ
随分殺シタ。兵ノ健康状態ハ悪カタ。兵ハ朝早くサニ
ンヲ出タスルコトヲ要求サレ、翌朝ノ二時カ三時ニ到ル迄歸
ツテ來ナカッタ。而モ其朝、夜が明タルト間モナク又出タスル
コトヲ強制サタ。時々日本人ニ抗議ヲ申込メタ結果、部下ノ
一部者ハ一二時間余分ニ休憩時間ヲ與ヘリタ。同地ハ

No 3

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雨期ニナツタ。兵ハ泥地ニ膝ヲ没シテ労働シタコトモ度々アツタ。
而モ着換ノ衣類ヲ持ツテ居ナリタ。食事ハ僅カニ足リル程度デ
アツタ。

ハ 部下ニ過失ガアツタ譯デハナイニ聞ラズ、常ニ何ヲ要求サレテ居ル
ノカ知ルコトノ出来ナカッタ部下ノ立場ヲ了解出来ズ、短氣ニ爲メ
ニ日本人兵達ハ行、床尾又ハ鉄ノ床尾デ殴打シテ部下ヲ
随分虐待シタ

九、 同地ノ日本人指揮官ハ「ホレ」/HOSHI/中尉デアツタ。
余ハ自分部隊、即チラハゼー隊及ビブラック/BLACK/隊ト
グリーン/GREEN/隊ヲ持ツテ居タ。

十、 朝鮮人監視ハ、明ラカニキャンプノ指揮官ノ指図ニ従ツテ、屢々
部下ニ労働ヲ強制シタ。「ホレ」/HOSHI/ハ屢々、我オノ軍
醫向同意ナクシテハ彼等ニ労働サセナイト約束シテラ、之ヲ彼ノ鮮人
事務担当者ニ通達シナカッタ。兎ニ角外見ハサウ見受ケラレタ。
斯クシテ朝、作業隊ガ編成サレ時分ハ彼ハ何ノ足シモナナ
カッタ。ソレテ朝鮮人達ハ彼等ノ指揮官カラ指図ヲ受ケテ居ルコ
トヲ否定シタ。一度、丁度指名サレタ部下ノ一隊ガ作業ヲ送り出サ
レル其ノ場ニ彼ヲ見附ケタ。余ハ彼ノ約束ヲ彼ニ注意シ部下ヲ彼
ニ指摘シタ。彼ハ部下ニキャンプニ歸ル様命令シタ。然レ其後
ト云フモノハ、彼ハ作業隊ガ送り出サレル時ニハ決シテ其ノ附近ニ居合
セナイ様ニ随分氣ヲ附ケテ居タ様ニ見受ケラレタ。此ノキャンプ

No 4

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テ八十名バカリ死セシタ。

士、

一五年／昭和十八年／四月カ五月デアッタ。我々ハ「オウニング」
/ Aungmyathazan / ト呼バレテ居ル一〇五キロキャンプニ移ツテ、

其處ニセケ月程居タ。我々ハ其處デ大分酷ク熱帶潰瘍ニ
ウツタ。多數ノ兵等ガ之ニカントツタ。死ノキャンプト呼バレテ居
ル五十五キロニハ病院ガアッタ。部下ノ中ニハ切断手術ヲ行フ爲
メニ其處ヘ送ラレタモノモ居タ。切断手術ヲ要スル患者ガ百以上其處
ニ居タ。或者ハ手術後死セシタ。一〇五キロキャンプノ軍醫ハ、

カミング / CUMMING / ヒギン / HIGGIN / アンダーソン / ANDERSON /
及ビホワイト / WHITE / ノ各大尉デアッタ。彼等ハ皆豪洲軍軍

醫西部 / A. A. M. C. / ノ人達デアッタ。我カキャンプノ兵員ハ

二、〇〇〇名乃至二、五〇〇名ノ間ヲ往來シテ居タ。元、一千名ヲ有シ
タ余ノ部隊デハ一ニ八名ヲ喪失シタ。余ハ余ノ部隊ノ死ニ率ヲ
十五パーセントニ喰ヒ止メタ。一〇五キロキャンプデハセケ月間ニ混成部隊
ヨリ一五八名ノ死セ者ヲ出シタ。

No 5

我カ兵ニ日本人及ビ朝鮮人ニ竹ヤ其ノ他デ打擲サレテ醫面ニ療
手當ヨ必要トサレタ幾多ノ例ガアッタ。朝鮮人ハ特ニ残虐デアッタ。
彼等ハ罰シヤウトスル者ニ對シテハ其ノ者ヲ所キラハズ、半バニ癒リカケ
タ潰瘍ノ上ヲモ殴打シタ。彼等ハ我カ兵ノ向脛ヲ、然モ潰瘍ヲ
ル向脛ヲ、蹴飛シタリシタコトモアル。日本人等ガ我兵ノ一人ノ脛ニ
棒ヲネジ込ムノ見タコトガアル。其處ノ指揮官ハ「ホシ」 / HOSH /
中尉デアッタ。

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十二、潰瘍、膝カラ踝ニテ擴ツテ、向脛ノ骨ガハ、九吋モ露出シタ。
 其レが黒クナッタ。潰瘍ガ足全体ニ擴ツテ居ルノヲ見タコトガアル。
 ヨードホルムノ問題ハ始終緊急ニ、問題デアッタ。部下ノ一人ハ足
 ガ ヨードホルムノ小サナ一塊ニ對シ時計ヲ交換シヨウト云フ條件ヲ荷
 チ出シテ來タ、ト余ニ云ツタ。彼ハ度々彼ノ時計ヲ交換スニ様セガ
 アレタガ、實際其ノ時計ハ彼ノ母親ノ贈物デアッタノデ手離シ度ク
 ハナクッタノデアル。然レ彼ハ戦友ガ遺骸ニ甘ニテ居ルノヲ較フ爲メ
 遂ニ其ノ時計ヲ手離シテヨードホルムト交換シタ。余ハ日本人指
 揮官對シ、其ノ壕、彼ノ部下ガ正規デナイ方ハニヨリテ辛フジテ手ニ入
 ル事ガ出来タノヲ告ゲタ。此、交換ハ其ノ日本人指揮官面前デ行
 ハレタノデアッタ。此ノヨードホルムハ全一吋半、長さ三吋位ノ壕ニツテ居タ。
 吾々ノ軍醫曹長校ハ之ヲテ數週間、充分ニ問合フトミツテ居タ。壕ニハ
 シツテルガ貼ラレテ居ナクッタ。

十三、一五キャンデーハ、多數ノ赤痢患者ト、マラリヤ患者ガ若干居タ。
 コレラデ死ニタ者モ三、四名居タ。藥治ノ乏殆ハナクッタ。後方遠ク
 ン
 グイン／トヒヨロ／カラエマチニテ得ヨウトシテ見タガ駄目デアッタ。

十四、一九四三年／昭和十八年／十二月、鉄道ノ完成後、我々ハ「タニカン」
 ／「エムエイトス」ニ移ッタ。

十五、鉄道ハ如何ナル犠牲ヲ拂ツテモ敷設セネバナラヌト云フ聲明
 ガアッタ。其ノ責任ハ、我ガA部隊ト「ジャバ」カラ來ク「ウィリアムズ」
 ／「WILLIAMS」大佐ノ部隊ヲ收容シテ居タ第三支所ノ指揮
 ニ當ツテ居タ「サガトモ」／「NAGATOMO」大佐ニ課セラレテ居タ。

No 6

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十六、其ノ後、「ナガトモ」NAGATOMO/大佐ニ代ツテ就任シテ
中村大佐モ同じ口振リデアツタ。彼ハ我々ノ軍ニ烏合ノ衆
ニ過ギテト云ヒ又我々ノ身ノ安全ニ日本帝國ノ軍隊ニ依
存シテイルノタト云ツタ。一度、「ナガトモ」NAGATOMO/
大佐ガサウ云フ聲明ヲ日本語デ讀ミエハテ、彼ノ通譯
ガ其ノヲ英語デ讀ミエテタコトガアル。其ノ寫シガ若干
残ツテ居ル。其ノ寫シハ我々ニ渡サレタデアル。

十七、「ナガトモ」NAGATOMO/ハ三度キャンフニヤツテ來
タコトガアルガ全体ヲ見廻ラサカツタ。終頃ニツテカラハ、
彼、余ニ度モ會フタコトヲサシテ一般的ニ何カ許ヘルト
ハチカト聞イタコトヲサカツタ。余ガ初メ頃此兩名ニ會
ツタ其ノ以後ニ發ルコトヲ指令ハ如何ナルモノデアッタ
カハ知ラナイガ、此、日本人指揮官兩名共何レモ彼等ノ
發ルタ指令ハ実行セシルモノト保證ニテ受メサカツタ。
思フタ彼等ハ始メカラ終迄指令ヲ發シヤウトスル意
志ガサカツタノタラウ。日本人指揮官等ハ何時モ責任
ヲ免シヨウトバカリ思フテ居タ様ニ思ハル。面會ニ行ク
ト「ホシ」HOSHI/ハ從卒ヲヨコシテ、氣分ガ悪イカラ
靜カニシテ居サレバナリ又ト傳ヘサセタ。一度彼ノ所ヘ出掛
ケルハ早過ギタ爲メ宿舎ノ縁側カラ、窓越ニテ度寢
床ニ入ラントスルコトヲ見附ケタ。服ヲ着タ儘、長靴ヲ
履キテ居タ。サレバ彼ノ出テ來テ我々ニ會ツタ。然レ此
レハ彼ノゴマカレデアツタ。

No 7

十六、一九四四年/昭和十九年/二月一日、我々「タマルカン」TAMARKAN/ニ到着

Doc 5038A

ニタ。此處ハ休憩所ト稱サレテ居タ。最初ノ數ヶ月間ノ
食事ハ今マデ與ヘラレテ居タモノヨリハ大分良カワタ。我
々カ着イタ頃兵隊モ左程多クハ居ナカワタガ、ジャング
ルヤジャングルノ中ニ在ルキャンポカラ續々絶エズマツテ
来テ五月マデニハ之ガ約五千名ニ達シタト思フ。

十九、ミシホラシルソトビンタハ始終絶エナカワタ。毎日ノコトデ
アワタ。一時、キャンポノ指揮ハ松崎^{音譯} MATSUZAKI
ノカトワテ居タ。指揮官ノ変更ニ就イテハ、日本人側カ
ラ一度モ自分ニ知ラセカナカワタ。

二十、一九四四年昭和十九年ノ八月ニ日本兵ハ自分達ノ隊ノ
再編成ヲ實施シタ。ガアレー^{音譯} VARLEY 準將ノ地
位ヲ引継イダ「アンダーソン」ANDERSON 大佐ハ余ノ
指揮權ヲ引継イダ。

二十一、「タマルカン」Tamarkan^{音譯}ニハ若干死セ者カ出タ。

暗黒ノ月BLACK MONTHニハ一日ニニ名位矢ワタ。
我々ハ死体ヲ直接貨物自動車カラ引取ワタ。此死セ大
部分ハ赤痢、熱病及ビ營養失調ニ基因スルモノダ
ワタ。我々ハキニーネモマテアリンモ持タナカワタ。ナガ
トモ「NAGATOMO」本部ニハ日本人軍醫ガ入居
テ時折キャンポヲ訪シタ。相変ラズ例ノ調子デ部下ハ
大分病弱デアルトイフ事ヲ肯定シタガ、後ニツテ指揮官ハ
余ニ對シ、軍醫ノ報告ニ依ルト、仕事ヲスルニハ差支ヘナイト事
デアワタ。此ノ日本人軍醫ノ名前ハ樋口^{音譯} HIGUCHI
ノデアワタ。タマルカンTamarkan^{音譯}ノ軍医ハ「ホサワ

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NOBOSAWA / テアワタ。ニ人何モ醫國學の素養ハナカワタ
ヤウニ思フ。樋口 / HIGUCHI / ハ齒科醫國テアワタシオボサワ / N
OBOSAWA / ハ獸醫國テアワタ。我方ノ先任軍醫國ハハミルトン / HA
MILTON / 大佐テアワタ。タマルカン / Tamar Kan / テハハミルトン / HA
MILTON / 大佐ノ前ハ、ズフト「ホフブス」 / HOBBS / 少佐カ軍醫ヲ務
メテ居ラシタ。

二五、我々ハ九四五年昭和二十年ノ二月彼等カ兵 / ORS / ト將校ヲ別々
ニ分ケルマデ「タマルカン」 / Tamar Kan / ニ居タ。

二六、我々壕、英、米、蘭ヲ合ルミ、〇〇〇名ノ一行ハ「カンブリ」 / Ka
mbury / ニ移サシタ。全部將校テアワタ。彼等ハ將校達ヲ、河
上及ヒ徒歩ニヨリ、六日間ノ旅程デ新シイキャンプニ移動サ
セタ。五〇〇名ヅ、ヲ一組シテ出タシタ。五組ハ各五日ノ
間隔ヲ置イテ既ニ出タシテ居タ。余ハ「バンコック」 / B
ANGKOK / ニ夜到着シタ。我々ハ戦争カ終ワタト通
告サシタ。キャンプノ位置「バンコック」 / BANGKOK /
向側テアワタ。

二七、「ナガトモ」 / Nagatomo / ノ主任參謀「ニトウ」 / N
ITO / 中尉カ一度我々ノキャンプヲ訪ツレ
タ。彼カ来ル時ハ決ツテ酒ヲ飲ンテ居タ。
彼ハ「グリーン」 / Green / 少佐「フアラウ
ク」 / Farlow / 大佐 / BLACK / 及余ニ對シ、立派ナ一死
ヲ約束出タルト云ワタ。ソシテ、事能バカ
悪化シタヲ彼自ラ我々ヲ射殺スルト云ツ
タ。